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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRYON LEE MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 46429-2018
Bonneville County Case No. CR-201711703-FE

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Bryon Lee Moore failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed aggregated sentences of 35 years with 10 years fixed upon Moore’s convictions
for possessing child pornography, distributing child pornography, and lewd conduct with a sixyear-old child?
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ARGUMENT
Moore Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Police found “over 10,000 images” of child pornography on Moore’s computer. (PSI, p.

6. 1) Moore admitted having a “diaper fetish” and exchanging images of child pornography. (Id.)
He admitted he had been sexually molesting his six-year-old daughter since she was an infant, by
performing oral sex on her and by using her body to masturbate himself. (Id.)
The state charged Moore with five counts of possession of sexually exploitative material,
one count of distribution of sexually exploitative material, and one count of lewd conduct with a
child. (R., pp. 64-66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement Moore pled guilty to one count of possession
of sexually exploitative material, one count of distributing sexually exploitative material, and one
count of lewd conduct with a child and the state dismissed four counts of possession of sexually
exploitative material. (R., pp. 88-93, 115, 117.) The district court imposed concurrent sentences
of 10 years with 10 years determinate for possession of sexually exploitative materials, 30 years
with 10 years determinate for distribution of sexually exploitative materials, and 35 years with 10
years determinate for lewd conduct with a child. (R., pp. 107-09.) Moore filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp. 121-23.)
Moore contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion in light of “mitigating
factors.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) The “mitigating factors” are a feather in comparison to the
heinousness of Moore’s crimes and the harm he has caused.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Moore Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
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appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392
P.3d at 1236–37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court considered the proper factors in sentencing. (Tr., p. 49, L. 20 – p. 50, L.
1.) The district court considered favorably Moore being “very forthcoming” in acknowledging his
culpability and expressing remorse. (Tr., p. 49, Ls. 12-23; p. 50, Ls. 2-14.) The district court
considered the seriousness of the charges and amount of harm Moore caused, concluding “it does
not get any worse.” (Tr., p. 50, L. 15 – p. 51, L. 18.) The district court stated the psychosexual
evaluation left it “troubled.” (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 18-19.) Therefore, the district court crafted the
sentences to make sure that Moore was “subject to the Department of Corrections” for his adult
life. (Tr., p. 52, L. 24 – p. 53, L. 3.) It also concluded that “the 10 years fixed is consistent with
those four objectives of criminal punishment.” (Tr., p. 53, Ls. 4-6.)
Moore argues the district court abused its discretion because there are “mitigating factors.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) First, he claims a lack of a “serious criminal record.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 4.) While that is true in terms of convictions, his criminal record is actually extremely extensive.
He did not acquire 10,000 images of infants and toddlers in sexually provocative poses and
conditions or outright sexual acts (PSI, p. 6) on a whim or impulse or overnight. Rather, the
evidence suggests that Moore was engaged in this criminal conduct for many years. (PSE, p. 7
(started viewing child pornography when he was 23); PSI, p. 1 (age 36 at time of sentencing).) He
developed a taste for images of females age six to 12 being “molested, harmed or humiliated by
adult males” including “bondage and restraint.” (PSE, pp. 7-8.) Likewise, he sexually molested
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his daughter for at least three to four years, starting when she was one year old. (PSE, p. 7.) Far
from showing a lack of a criminal record, the evidence shows Moore was extensively engaged in
criminal behavior over a prolonged period.
Moore also argues that his military service is mitigating. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) He does
not say why. There is no indication, for example, that his criminal activity was a result of his
service in the Navy. (See, e.g., PSE, p. 26 (Moore’s “deviant sexual interests pre-date his military
service”).) Whatever weight this factor was entitled to, Moore has not shown an abuse of
discretion.
Moore next argues he was “amenable to treatment,” in part because he admitted the offense
and expressed guilt and remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) The district court specifically
considered Moore’s forthrightness in expressing his culpability and his expression of remorse.
(Tr., p. 49, Ls. 12-23; p. 50, Ls. 2-14.) Moore has shown no abuse of discretion in considering
this factor.
The district court weighed the appropriate factors, including community protection, and
balanced the serious nature of Moore’s crimes in crafting a sentence that will hold Moore
responsible, protect the community and offer at least some chance for Moore to earn parole. Moore
has shown no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2019.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of April, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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